EXTENDED ABSTRACT Most complex human interactions, ranging from adversarial behavior to transactions on economic and financial markets to determination of opinions and social influence, involve the simultaneous strategic actions of a very large number of agents, influencing each other in diverse ways. Network games have been proposed as a systematic framework for the formal analysis of such interactions [2, 5] . When the number of agents increases, however, general unstructured networks become computationally intractable while parametric network models, such as Erdös-Rényi or stochastic block models, may not have enough degrees of variations to capture complex large group interactions. Graphons have recently gained popularity as a nonparametric network model to overcome such difficulties and represent a rich class of agent interactions while allowing for consistent estimation from network data [1, 9, 10] . The objective of this work is to exploit the framework of graphons to study strategic behavior in very large populations, while still accounting for local heterogeneity in agent interactions. To this end, we introduce and study the properties of a new class of infinite population games, termed graphon games, and we show that these games can be used to model the limiting strategic behavior for network games of increasing population size.
additionally derive a comparative static result quantifying the effect of graphon changes on the equilibrium outcome.
As our next contribution we exploit our infinite population analysis to approximate strategic behavior in large but finite populations. To this end, we note that besides their interpretation as limiting object of graph sequences, graphons have been recently considered as a nonparametric generalization of random graph models. According to this paradigm, the finite size networks that we observe in applications can be thought of as a stochastic realization of an underlying graph generating model. We show that one can use the equilibrium of the graphon game associated with the generating graphon to approximate the equilibrium of any game played over a sampled network.
We provide a precise mathematical bound for the approximation error in terms of the size of the sampled network and the maximum eigenvalue of the generating graphon. Moreover, we show that intervention strategies designed using graphon information yield almost optimal performance when applied to games played over sampled networks. This statistical approach to the analysis and intervention in network games offers several advantages: it requires less information, allows for out-of-sample generalization and, in many cases, it may be more efficient than a case-by-case analysis over large unstructured graphs. We illustrate our theoretical results by focusing on a specific class of graphon games characterized by linear quadratic cost functions.
Different infinite population models such as mean field games [4, 8] , population games [11] and aggregative games [3, 6, 7] have been considered in the literature. Our work complements these models by incorporating heterogeneous local effects in infinite population games, while still providing a relatively low dimensional and tractable representation.
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